

Chapter 4
Misunderstandings





This chapter is based on Kutlaca, M., van Zomeren, M., & Epstude, K (under review). *Making a difference: How activists and non-activists perceive and evaluate each other.*

Lay perceptions, as indicated by a Thesaurus search, typically relate *activist* to words like 'militant' or 'radical', but also to 'idealist' and 'romantic', thus suggesting an image of a person driven by values and ideals in the face of many obstacles to social change. This fits with theory and research that those who are actively fighting collective disadvantage are often motivated by perceived violation of group values, rights, or convictions (e.g., "intuitive theologians" as Van Zomeren and Spears (2009) used one of Tetlock's (2002) metaphors). By contrast, those who do not act for the group are often viewed as individualist "free-riders" (or "intuitive economists"; Van Zomeren & Spears, 2009), who benefit from the collective good without having to act personally, and for whom instrumental concerns seem to prevail (e.g., Kelly & Breinlinger, 1995; Van Zomeren et al., 2008). Together, this paints a picture of two very different subgroups within a disadvantaged group, defined by their tendency toward *action* versus *inaction* on behalf of the group, which is associated with collective-moral or individual-instrumental reasons, respectively.

It seems clear that efforts toward social change are facilitated by positive relationships between these active and inactive subgroups within the disadvantaged group. Yet, surprisingly little is known about how members of those subgroups perceive and evaluate each other. It is possible that these perceptions may be quite positive. Indeed, the smaller group of morally driven and active individuals may be perceived as 'heroes' by the larger group of those who remain inactive (Monin, Sawyer, & Marquez, 2008), while the former perceive the latter as potential allies or resources to be mobilized (e.g., Klandermans, 1984). Another possibility, however, is that these perceptions and evaluations are less positive. For instance, Dutch strikers had a rather negative view of their colleagues who did not participate and even boycotted the strike (Thommes, Akkerman, Torenvlied & Born, 2014). Moreover, individuals who voiced discontent about group-based discrimination were perceived as complainers by those who did not (Garcia, Schmitt, Branscombe, & Ellemers, 2010; Kaiser, Hagiwara, Malahy, & Wilkins, 2009). Therefore, our question is theoretically as well as practically relevant, as we consider that mutual misperceptions between the subgroups may lower their chances of forming a unified group in order to achieve social change.

In two field experiments, we surveyed a group of students amidst a demonstration against government plans likely to result in increased student debts, and a group of students who were not present at the demonstration. We then asked the protesters to evaluate a (fictitious) fellow student who voiced reasons for not going to the protest, whereas we asked those who were not at the protest to evaluate a (fictitious) fellow student who voiced reasons for going to the protest. In both studies, we manipulated two types of motivation (i.e. individual/collective and instrumental/moral), voiced as reasons

for (in)action. This enabled us to test whether members of the two subgroups perceive and evaluate each other in similar ways, and whether this depends on expectations of protesters as being collectively and morally motivated, and of non-protesters as being individualistically and instrumentally motivated.

Different Motivations for Collective Action

Research on collective action, defined as any action undertaken by individuals on behalf of a group to achieve group's goals, differentiates between individual and group-based motivations for collective action (Van Zomeren & Spears, 2009). Individual motivation is best captured by Tetlock's (2002) "intuitive economist" metaphor, which portrays humans as *individual* actors motivated solely by securing *instrumental* benefits through participation in collective action. This 'rational' view on motivation has dominated research on collective action in the 1960s and 1970s (Olson, 1968; see also Klandermans, 1984). Nowadays it is also evident in scholarly interest in the perceived effectiveness of a group or a collective action (Hornsey et al., 2006; Stürmer & Simon, 2004). More recent views on inaction suggests that individuals will not act for the group if they do not believe the group to be efficacious, or collective action to be effective, to achieve the relevant goal. Put differently, individuals' *inaction* in collective action contexts is best explained by their individual and instrumental motivations (e.g. disbelief in group efficacy).

Still, some members of the disadvantaged group seem to defy this individualist-instrumental logic. The social identity theory of collective action suggests that individuals can perceive themselves to be group members and thus think, feel, and act on behalf of the group (for a meta-analysis see Van Zomeren et al., 2008). In other words, those who act do so based on group concerns and are thus driven by their identification with the relevant group (Simon et al., 1998; Van Zomeren et al., 2008). Furthermore, theory and research has assumed that group identification includes internalized group norms and values, or more generally moral motivation to act for the group (Van Zomeren, 2013). Importantly, morals predicts whether individuals are prepared to sacrifice themselves for the group (Skitka et al., 2005; Tetlock, 2002), represent an important basis of a politicized identity (Mazzoni et al., 2015; Van Zomeren et al., 2012) and differentiate between those who actively support their group vs. those who remain passive (Turner-Zwinkels et al., 2016). Moral motivation is important for those mobilized by typically value-oriented movements (e.g. Civil Rights Movement), but also for those mobilized by a power-oriented movement (i.e. labour union) where instrumentality is assumed to be a primary motive for participation (Van Stekelenburg et al., 2009). Thus, protesters seem primarily motivated by collective and moral concerns.

Asymmetrical Perceptions and Evaluations of Protesters and Non-protesters?

Surprisingly little is known about how members of the same disadvantaged group defined by their (in)action evaluate each other. Nevertheless, there are some indirect pointers to consider. Individuals who confront blatant group-based discrimination, for example, seem to receive some support from their own group (Dodd, Giuliano, Boutell, & Moran, 2001; Garcia et al., 2010), although such positive perception and evaluation is easily eroded when the context of discrimination is perceived as ambiguous (Dodd et al., 2001), or when the protesters' actions are too extreme (Becker & Barreto, 2014). Indeed, those who act against group-based discrimination run the risk of being perceived as 'complainers', with their actions being evaluated as inappropriate or an 'overreaction' (Kaiser et al., 2009). Thus it remains unclear whether protesters are more likely to be perceived by non-protesters as 'heroes' or 'fools'.

On the other hand, protesters may hold rather negative views of the non-protesters. For instance, strike-breakers were judged harshly by strikers (Akkerman, Born, & Torenvlied, 2013; Thommes et al., 2014) due to a perceived violation of the solidarity norm (Akkerman et al., 2013). Similarly, those who engaged in more costly actions disidentified from the larger ingroup when they perceived other group members as lacking solidarity and commitment to the group cause (Becker, Tausch, Spears & Christ, 2011). This implies that those who are active are more likely to distance themselves from those who remain passive. And instead of perceiving them as assets, they might rather consider them as irrelevant or possibly even as hindrance to the group's cause.

We therefore expect that perceptions and evaluations between the subgroups will be *asymmetrical* in at least three ways. First, we expect that in terms of *character evaluation*, those who are active will perceive those who are passive as selfish and immoral which is in line with perceived violations of solidarity (Akkerman et al., 2013). By contrast, those who are passive will still evaluate those who are active positively (at least in the context of clear injustice; Dodd et al., 2011; Garcia et al., 2010), because they are working for the broader group that also includes those who are passive.

A particularly intriguing question here is whether those who are active *perceive* those who are passive as part of an *ingroup* (and vice versa). Since those who remain passive are seen as lacking the commitment to the group cause (Becker et al., 2011), it is possible that they will also be excluded from the group by those who do act. In contrast, as long as the active members make it clear that they act for the group that also includes the passive members, they should be seen as representative members of the same group. This once more implies asymmetrical perceptions between the

subgroups, suggesting that those who are active, rather than those who are passive, will draw clear boundaries between the two subgroups.

Third, we reasoned that this asymmetry should be most pronounced when a member of the other subgroup violates expectations associated with that subgroup. For example, if a non-protester communicates collective/moral motives as reasons for not protesting, (s)he violates the expectations that those who stay at home do so out of individual/instrumental reasons (Hornsey et al., 2006). Similarly, if protesters communicate individual/instrumental motives, they violate the expectation of protesters being driven by collective/moral concerns (Van Zomeren & Spears, 2009). We therefore manipulated the type of motivation (individual/collective, and moral/instrumental) expressed by a group member as reasons for (not) protesting. We hypothesized that protesters will be less negative towards a non-protester who provides individual and/or instrumental explanation for their inaction as those reasons fit their expectations about non-protesters. In contrast, they should be especially outraged at those who voice collective and/or moral reasons for remaining inactive. In a similar vein, we expect the non-protesters to be more positive about the protester who expresses collective and/or moral motivations for their action.

Overview of the Studies

We examined the mutual perceptions of active and passive subgroups of students in the context of recent protests in the Netherlands against government measures feared to further increase student study debts. The first study was conducted among students who took part in a nation-wide organized demonstration in November, 2014 in The Hague. The second study took place two months later among the students of University of Groningen who did not participate in the demonstration. In both studies, the participants read about a fellow student who provided individual/collective and instrumental/moral motives for not participating (Study 1) or for participating in the protest (Study 2), and were asked to evaluate the character and to judge how representative was the student of the larger ingroup. This context enabled us to define the two subgroups as those who went to the protest vs. those who did not. However, in order to check whether those groups also reflected the subgroups of interest, we also collected data about their own motivations to engage in collective action (which should fit with the collective-moral and individual-instrumental themes derived from the literature).

Study 1

METHOD

Participants, Procedure and Design

The sample consisted of 190 protesters attending the demonstration in The Hague on November 14, 2014, collected by five research assistants. There were around five thousand protesters in total according to the organizers (see http://www.omroepwest.nl/nieuws/2715375/Studentenprotest-op-Malieveld-Den-Haag-4-arrestaties-en-Jet-Bussemaker-bekogeld-met-tomaten). Three participants were excluded from the analyses as they turned out to be younger than 16 years[17] or failed to fill out the survey completely. The average age of protesters was relatively young (M_{age} = 19.96; SD = 4.68, range 16-46; 51.9% women; 6.4% did not indicate gender). The majority of the participants were students (51.9%) or were still attending high school (32.6 %). The sample was moderately politically active: 26.7% were members of a politically engaged student organizations or were invited by a politically active person to attend the protest (38%). Thus, our sample seemed to have consisted mostly of less experienced protesters.

90% of the data was collected during the four-hour protest in The Hague; a relatively small number of questionnaires were collected during the train ride from Groningen to The Hague. Each of five research assistants, who covered different parts of the demonstration, received 40 questionnaires and was blind to experimental conditions (the order of the experimental conditions was randomized). The design was a 2 (Individual vs. Collective Motivation) x 2 (Moral vs. Instrumental Motivation) between-subjects design.

The assistants were also given a counter and instructed to count every person they approached irrespective of them actually agreeing to participate. The response rate was high as 77% of the total number of protesters approached (i.e. 248) agreed to take part in the study. The informed consent and the questionnaire were administered together with another survey asking about the emotions that protesters would like to communicate to the general public, but this was always administered after our study. The study took about 5 minutes. The participants were debriefed and given a chocolate as a token of appreciation for taking part in the study.

17 According to the ethics committee of the University of Groningen and Dutch law, an individual younger than 16 is considered to be a minor and thus cannot participate in a study without a parental consent.

Materials

Pre-measures.

Since the study was conducted as a field experiment in a presumably less controlled context compared to laboratory experiments, we included a number of pre-measures to make sure that randomization was successful, or otherwise use them as covariates in our analyses. Furthermore, the pre-measures enabled us to empirically compare the samples across the two studies, as we expected them to reflect the two qualitatively different subgroups. Thus, before the manipulation, participants were asked to indicate to what extent they perceived the government's measures to be unfair and immoral, identified as a student (group identification) and as an activist subgroup (i.e. identification with students who are actively opposing these measures), believed in the group's efficacy to achieve its goals, intended to engage in future action (i.e. intentions to protest again against these measures) and felt personally affected by the government measures. All the items were measured on 7-point Likert-type scales ranging from 1- *Strongly disagree* to 7- *Strongly agree*.

Manipulation.

Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions. They read about a fellow student *J.* who did not come to the demonstration and expressed different motives (individual vs. collective) and (moral vs. instrumental) for doing so. In the two moral conditions participants read about *J.* who expressed agreement with the cause but decided not to go because "… I don't believe it's *my personal moral obligation/ our collective moral obligation as current students* to fight for an equal access to education in the future". In the two instrumental conditions, *J.* said "…I don't believe that *my personal presence / our collective presence at the protest as current students* will have an effect on the government's plans for education in the future".

Dependent variables

Character evaluation.

Next, we asked the participants to judge the fellow student on several dimensions: perceived sociability (i.e. adjectives selfish, egoistic, and social), morality (arrogant, honest, moral and principled) and rationality (irrational, realistic and pragmatic). The scale for all the items ranged from 1 – *Strongly disagree* to 7- *Strongly agree*. The principal component analyses with Oblimin rotation extracted three factors, with eigenvalues larger than one, which explained 56.83% variance. The factors were weakly correlated (ranging from .03 to .21). The items loaded highly on the respective

dimensions, with the exception of arrogant and social which loaded on different factors. We used the original items to calculate an average rating for selfish (items: selfish, egoistic, and arrogant; Cronbach's $\alpha = .76$) and moral scale (items: social, honest, moral, and principled; Cronbach's $\alpha = .65$). Overall, we expected the non-protesters to be evaluated as relatively selfish and immoral, especially when the communication included collective and/or moral reasons.

Moreover, the item pragmatic was dropped out of the analysis, for the reason that during the data collection, a lot of participants indicated that they were not familiar with the meaning of the word, and mirroring those comments the item did not load highly on any of the factors. We decide however not to combine the items irrational and realistic as the reliability of the scale was too low, $r(182) = .26$, $p < .001$; Spearman-Brown reliability coefficient = .42.

Group representativeness.

To capture if the protesters see the non-protesters as part of the same group, we asked them to judge to what extent *J.* was representative of the group who opposed the government's measures (i.e. the protesters' group), but also of the larger ingroup (i.e. all students) and the group who supported the government's measures. The scale for all items ranged from 1 – *Strongly disagree* to 7- *Strongly agree*. We expected the non-protesters to be seen as more representative of the group who supports the government's measure rather than the protester group.

Expectation violation.

We asked participants to what extent they felt angry and outraged towards *J.* (1 – *Not at all* to 7 - *Very much*), as an indicator of a violation of their expectations. If the protesters intuitively believe that the non-protesters are driven by individual and/or instrumental logic, we expect more anger and more outrage in the conditions where *J.* violates those expectations, i.e. when he/she expresses collective and/or moral motivations for inaction.

Explorative items.

In addition to character evaluation, we also asked the participants to evaluate *J.*'s reasons for not coming to the protest. More specifically, the participants had to indicate to what extent *J.*'s reason for not coming was justified (1 – *Not at all justified* to 7 - *Very justified)*, and to what extent it represented an individual or a group opinion (1- *Individual opinion* to 7 – *Opinion of all students*). Furthermore, the participants were asked to indicated how similar *J.* was to themselves personally and to what extent they found *J.* likeable (1- *Not at all* to 7 - *Very much*). Also, as the fellow

student was only introduced through initials, we asked participants whether they thought *J.* is male or female, and what *J.*'s political orientation is (1-*Left* to 7-*Right*).

Demographics.

At the end of the survey, participants filled out the demographics: age, gender, education (high school students, college/university students or done with studying), and political orientation (1-*Left* to 7-*Right*)[18].

RESULTS

Pre-measures: Who are the protesters?

Unsurprisingly, the protesters perceived government measures as highly unfair (M = 5.77, SD = 1.19) and they moralized the issue to a great extent (M = 5.66, SD = 1.45). They identified highly with both the larger ingroup (M = 5.74, SD = 1.36) and with the politicized group (M = 5.72, SD = 1.38), and they were planning to participate in future actions against government's plans (M = 5.47, SD = 1.44).

Interestingly, participants' efficacy expectations were somewhat lower (M = 4.59, SD = 1.66). The protesters perceived themselves to be relatively affected by these measures, though that seemed to vary to a larger extent across the sample (M = 4.67, SD = 2.33). This is not surprising as the sample consisted of students who were finished with their studies and high-schools students who were the first generation to be directly hit by these measures. The participants were on average on the left of the political spectrum (M =3.36, SD = 1.67).

In order to check if the randomization worked, we conducted a 2 (Individual vs. Collective) x 2 (Moral vs. Instrumental) ANOVA on all the pre-measures. There were no significant differences between the conditions on all the variables, apart from one significant interaction term on personal affectedness F (1, 183) = 4.91, p = .028, η_p^2 = .026. As this indicated a somewhat unequal balance across the conditions, we decided to include this item as a covariate, but across the board, randomization seemed successful.

18 In both studies we also asked the participants about their most important motives for (not) joining. The motives mirrored the manipulation. Confirming the image of an activist driven by collective-moral concerns, more than 50% of the participants chose moral obligation as their main motive, with the collective moral obligation being the most popular choice overall (31%). In line with assumed motivations for inaction, most participants in Study 2 (above 80%) indicated instrumental reasons for not joining the protest and about half of the sample (52%) picked the individual instrumental reason.

Evaluation of the Non-Protester J.

Character evaluation.

Overall, the protesters see *J.* as neither positive nor negative. Indeed, all the scores were about midpoint of the scale (see Table 4.1). In line with our assumptions, a 2x2 ANCOVA (with personal affectedness as a covariate) we found the effects or our manipulations on the extent to which the non-protester was seen as selfish and irrational. The results remained the same irrespective of the covariate being included in the analyses or not (the covariate contributed significantly to the models only two times across all the analyses). Specifically, *J.* was perceived as more selfish when (s)he denied either individual or collective moral obligation to participate ($M_{adjusted}$ = 4.24, *SE* = 0.14), in contrast to when he/she denied individual or collective instrumentality ($M_{adjusted}$ = 3.69, *SE* = 0.15), *F* (1, 187) = 7.31, *p* = .008, η_p^2 = .039. Furthermore, *J.* was seen as more irrational when he/she expressed individual motives for inaction ($M_{adjusted}$ = 4.18, *SE* = 0.15), in contrast to expressing the collective ones ($M_{adjusted}$ = 3.68, *SE* = 0.15,), *F* (1, 181) = 5.50, *p* = .02, η_p^2 = .029.

Group representativeness.

As expected, *J.* was not seen as representative member of the protesters' group (*M* = 2.25, *SD* = 1.54) and was more seen as representing the group that supports the government (*M* = 3.45, *SD* = 1.78; see Table 4.1). More importantly, *J.* was also not seen as particularly representative of the larger ingroup, i.e. all students (*M* = 3.19, *SD* = 1.56)[19]. There were no effects of the manipulations on these variables, implying that irrespective of the reasons the non- protesters may provide they are not very likely to be seen as members of the same group as protesters.

Expectation violation.

In line with the effects observed on the perceived selfishness, the participants were more outraged when the non-protester denied moral obligation for action ($M_{adjusted}$ = 4.03, *SE* = 0.19) compared to instrumentality ($M_{adjusted}$ = 3.40, *SE* = 0.19), *F*(1, 180) = 5.58, *p* = .019, η_p^2 = .03. Furthermore, there was a significant interaction term on the extent to which the participants felt angry towards *J.*, *F* (1, 180) = 5.30, *p* = .022, η_p^2 = .029 (see Table 2). Denying collective moral obligation induced the most anger ($M_{adjusted}$ = 3.80, *SE* = 0.26). The simple effect comparisons revealed a significant difference between the denial of collective moral obligation and collective instrumentality ($M_{adjusted}$ = 2.90, *SE* = 0.26), *F* (1, 180) = 6.07, *p* = .015, η_p^2 = .033, suggesting that the combination of the collective and moral motives may represent the strongest violation of protesters' expectations. The

19 The average scores on all three times were significantly different from the midpoint of the scale.

denial of individual moral obligation ($M_{adjusted}$ = 3.28, *SE* = 0.25) or instrumentality evoked similar levels of anger ($M_{adjusted}$ = 3.57, *SE* = 0.26), *F* < 1.

Explorative analyses.

There were no effects of our manipulations on the items evaluating *J.*s reason not to join (see Table 4.2). Unsurprisingly, the reasons for inaction were seen as relatively unjustified (*M* = 3.48, *SD* = 1.60) and as representing an individual opinion rather than a view of all the students, since the mean was well below midpoint of the scale (*M* = 2.64, *SD* = 1.86), and *J.* was not much liked (*M* = 3.21, *SD* = 1.24). However, in line with the effects on perceived selfishness and expectancy violations, denying moral obligation decreased the perception of personal similarity more ($M_{adjusted}$ = 2.45, *SE* = 0.15) compared to denying the instrumentality of the protest ($M_{adjusted}$ = 2.90, *SE* = 0.16), *F* (1, 180) = 4.07, *p* = .045, η_p^2 = .022. Plus, *J.* who denied moral obligation was seen as more right wing ($M_{adjusted}$ = 4.89, *SE* = 0.15) compared to *J.* who denied instrumentality ($M_{adjusted}$ = 4.11, *SE* = 0.15), *F* (1, 179) = 12.37, *p* = .001, η_p^2 = .065.

There were no effects of manipulations on perception of gender. Overall, *J.* was twice as much likely to be seen as a man than as a woman (64.2% vs. 27.8 %), χ^2 (1) = 26.88, *p* < .001.

Table 4.1

Study 1: Character Evaluation and Group Representativeness of a Non-protester J.

	Manipulations							
	Moral				Instrumental			
	Individual		Collective		Individual		Collective	
Dependent variables	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*
Egoistic	4.03[ab]	1.32	4.45 [a]	1.46	3.67 [ab]	1.32	3.70 [b]	1.38
Moral	3.76	1.20	3.68	1.32	3.77	0.87	3.81	1.01
Irrational	4.20 [a]	1.55	3.85 [ab]	1.43	4.16 [a]	1.55	3.50 [b]	1.23
Realistic	3.08	1.48	3.04	1.67	3.51	1.61	3.16	1.46
Represents all students	3.08	1.48	3.04	1.67	3.51	1.61	3.16	1.46
Represents politicized group	2.04	1.12	2.13	1.64	2.55	1.72	2.33	1.65
Represents students who support the government	3.65	1.69	3.55	2.00	3.23	1.67	3.33	1.76

Note. Superscripts refer to significant mean differences.

Table 4.2

Study 1: Expectation Violations and Explorative Items

	Manipulations							
	Moral				Instrumental			
	Individual		Collective		Individual		Collective	
	M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*
Angry at J.	3.31[ab]	1.60	3.74[a]	1.94	3.55 [ab]	1.63	2.96[b]	1.82
Outraged at J.	3.90 [ab]	1.76	4.13 [a]	1.96	3.52 [ab]	1.77	3.31 [b]	1.77
Reason legitimacy	3.84	1.46	3.37	1.77	3.35	1.33	3.36	1.77
Group opinion	2.67	1.91	2.83	1.98	2.86	1.94	2.18	1.54
Liking	3.04	1.21	3.13	1.39	3.26	0.93	3.43	1.35
Personal similarity	2.51	1.53	2.40	1.48	2.93	1.53	2.87	1.50
J. Political orientation	4.85 [a]	1.28	4.89 [a]	1.52	4.34 [ab]	1.21	3.89 [b]	1.68

Note. Superscripts refer to significant mean differences.

DISCUSSION

In line with expectations, our findings indicated that the protesters evaluated the non-protester *J.* relatively negatively and perceived him/her, across the board, as unrepresentative of the larger ingroup. Specifically, in line with our hypotheses communicating moral in contrast to instrumental motivations for inaction lead to harsher character evaluation (i.e. selfishness), further increased the distance towards the non-protester both in terms of personal and ideological dissimilarity, and induced more negative emotions. Denying collective moral obligation particularly increased the feelings of anger towards the non-protester, although overall the protesters did not differentiate much between those who emphasized individual or collective motivations for inaction (apart from the effects on irrationality). However, their expectations of non-protesters' motivations were clearly violated in the conditions where they were confronted with those who explicitly denied moral obligation to act.

The perceptions of the students who participated in the protest resemble the findings among the Dutch strikers and non-strikers (Akkerman et al., 2013, Thommes et al., 2014). Our findings complement previous work by showing that the protesters evaluate differently those who break the *solidarity norms* out of moral or out of instrumental reasons. In line with Tetlock (2002) and Skitka et al. (2005), negating the moral background of the collective struggle evokes outrage and judgment by those who act for the group. More importantly, breaking the solidarity norm means that those who did not act are at risk of being excluded from the group by those who do as the protesters clearly drew a line between them and those who stayed at home.

In order to gauge how the passive group members view the active group, we also sampled inactive members of the same group and asked them to evaluate an active student. We repeated the manipulation by changing the phrasing slightly to match a fellow protester's motivations for going to the demonstration, keeping the design and the dependent variables as similar to the previous study as was possible. We expected the non-protesters to have a relatively positive view of the protesters and especially of those who communicate the concerns for the collective (as this includes the inactive subgroup). When it comes to communicating moral or instrumental motivations, the literature suggest that the moral communication might indeed be more persuasive (Benford & Snow, 2000), especially as it should match the expectations of who the protesters are better.

Study 2

METHOD

Participants, Procedure and Design

This sample, collected two months after Study 1[20], consisted of 145 students enrolled at the University of Groningen. The average age of this sample was similar compared to the Study 1 sample (M_{age} = 20.2; *SD* = 2.09, range 17-29; 64.6% women; one person did not indicate gender). The participants were university students from various disciplines. Unlike the sample from Study 1, these participants were not politically active. In fact, only two participants were members of the politically involved student organizations (only one student went to the protest and was excluded from the analyses). Moreover, 80% of the sample indicated that they did not know anyone who went to the protest. The sample was on average somewhat more right wing in contrast to the protesters in Study 1 (*M* = 3.80, *SD* = 1.26).

The data was collected during the last two weeks in January 2015. Two research assistants approached students in the canteens and libraries across different parts of the university. The questionnaire took about 5 minutes. All participants were debriefed at the end and were given a chocolate as a token of appreciation for taking part in the study. As in Study 1, the design was a 2 (Individual vs. Collective Motivation) x 2 (Moral vs. Instrumental Motivation) between-subjects design.

Materials

Pre-measures.

We used the same pre-measures as in Study 1 and added the identification with the group that supports the government. Since these were the students who did not go to the protest and thus may not think that the issue is personally relevant for them, we also asked them if they cared if the measures were adopted.

Manipulation.

The manipulation matched the one in the previous study, the only difference being that the participants now read about a fellow student *J.* who went to the demonstration and

20 We did not collect the data for Study 2 on the day of the protest itself. However, collecting the data at a later point enabled us to gauge the opinions of the non-protesters which are not biased by personal reasons for not going to the protest.

expressed individual/collective moral motivation (i.e. "it's *my personal moral obligation / our collective moral obligation as current students* to fight for an equal access to education in the future") or instrumental motivation for participating in collective action (i.e. "*my personal presence / our collective presence at the protest as current students* will have an effect on the government's plans for education in the future").

Dependent Variables

Character evaluation.

Participants were asked to evaluate *J.* on same dimensions as protesters. The principal component analyses with Oblimin rotation again extracted three factors, with eigenvalues larger than one, which explained 61.65% variance (the factors were again weakly correlated .03. to .26). We calculated the same selfish scale (i.e. selfish, egoistic and arrogant Cronbach's $\alpha = .76$) and moral (i.e. social, moral, honest and principled, Cronbach's $\alpha = .69$), but again we did not combine the items irrational and realistic as well ($r(142) = .39$, $p < .001$; Spearman-Brown reliability coefficient = .56). Pragmatic was dropped from further analyses as it lowered the reliability of the moral scale. We expected the protester *J.* to be evaluated as sociable and moral person and even more so if he/she communicated collective and/or moral motives for action.

Group representativeness.

The non-protesters were asked to what extent is *J.* representative of the larger ingroup (i.e. all students), but also of the group who is opposing the governmental plans (i.e. the politicized group). We assumed that if the non-protesters perceive the protesters as part of the same group, than *J.* should be seen as a representative member of the larger ingroup, not just her/his politicized group.

Perception of authority.

We also asked the participants if the protester intended to impose her/his views on others. In line with Monin et al. (2008), we wanted to see whether those who act upon or communicate their values may come across as self-righteous and/or preaching to others. The participants indicated the agreement (1 – *Strongly disagree* to 7- *Strongly agree*) with items "students like *J.* want to influence others" and "students like *J.* act as a moral authority"[21].

21 Of course these items per se do not necessarily imply negative evaluations. However, being perceived as wanting to influence others correlated positively with the extent to which the protester was judged as selfish $r(140) = .38$, $p < .001$, and was disliked $r(138) = -.28$, $p = .001$. This speaks that to the fact that communicating moral motivation may not be necessarily beneficial.

Explorative items.

As in Study 1 we asked the participants to evaluate *J.*'s reasons for going to the protest, liking, personal closeness, gender and political orientation. The scale for all the items ranged from 1 – *Not at all* to 7- *Very much.*

Demographics.

Participants filled out the same demographics and we also included a question of how many people they knew who went to the protest.

RESULTS

Pre-measures: Who are the non-protesters?

Since the two studies provided different samples that are difficult to directly compare, descriptively at least the non-protesters did seem clearly different, motivation-wise, from the protester sample in Study 1. First of all, they moralized the issue to a lesser extent (M = 4.07, SD = 1.57). Second, while they identified highly with the students as a group (M = 5.51, SD = 1.22), their identification with the politicized group was much lower (M = 4.00, SD = 1.51) compared to the Study 1 protesters. Most importantly, they had relatively little faith in students' capability to influence the situation (M = 3.06, SD = 1.48).

We then tested whether randomization was successful. Although participants were randomly assigned to the conditions and were approached by the research assistants blind to the hypotheses, the 2x2 ANOVA did show significant difference (mostly marginal) between the groups on perceptions of illegitimacy, group efficacy and personal affectedness. Thus, we included all three variables as covariates in the following analyses[22].

Evaluation of the Protester J.

Character evaluation.

Overall, as we expected *J.* was perceived rather positively (see Table 4.3). For example, (s)he was perceived as rather selfless (M = 2.52, SD = 0.93), highly moral (M = 5.12, SD = 0.72), but not irrational (M = 3.30, SD = 1.31).

22 We will discuss the issue with randomization in the limitations section of the general discussion. Moreover, both illegitimacy and efficacy contributed significantly to most of the analyses, while personal affectedness did not.

However, the communicated motivations for action had no effects on character evaluation, except for a strong main effect of reason on the perception of how realistic *J.* was, F (1, 137) = 17.93, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .116$. The protester who communicated individual or collective moral motivation for going to the protest was perceived as more realistic ($M_{adjusted}$= 4.49, SE = 0.13) compared with the protester who communicated instrumental motivation ($M_{adjusted}$ = 3.70, SE = 0.13).

Group representativeness.

As expected, *J.* was seen as representative of the politicized group (M = 5.48, SD = 1.21). More importantly, the manipulations had an effect on the extent to which *J.* was seen as representative member of the larger ingroup (see Table 4.3). Specifically and in line with our assumptions, *J.* was judged as more representative when the communication emphasized the collective ($M_{adjusted}$ = 4.67, SE = 0.13), rather than individual motives for attending the protest ($M_{adjusted}$ = 4.27, SE = 0.13,), F (1, 137) = 4.57, p = .034, η_p^2 = .032.

Table 4.3

Study 2: Character Evaluation and Group Representativeness of a Protester J.

	Manipulations							
	Moral				Instrumental			
	Individual		Collective		Individual		Collective	
Dependent variables	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*
Egoistic	2.56	1.04	2.46	1.05	2.76	0.87	2.26	0.69
Moral	5.17	0.74	5.25	0.67	4.98	0.77	5.10	0.68
Irrational	3.14	1.33	3.14	1.24	3.63	1.38	3.26	1.24
Realistic	4.25[a]	1.36	4.63 [a]	1.19	3.53 [b]	1.29	3.97 [b]	1.32
Represents all students	4.19 [a]	1.45	4.89 [b]	1.08	4.24 [a]	1.17	4.57 [ab]	1.04
Represents politicized group	5.53	1.06	5.57	1.42	5.43	1.04	5.40	1.31

Note. Superscripts refer to significant mean differences.

J. as an authority.

Interestingly (see Table 4.4), *J.* was perceived as intending to influence others more in moral ($M_{adjusted}$ = 2.85, *SE* = 0.12) in contrast to instrumental conditions ($M_{adjusted}$ = 2.41, *SE* = 0.12), *F* (1, 135) = 6.61, *p* = .011, η_p^2 = .047. Also, there was a significant interaction on the extent to which protester was perceived as acting like a moral authority *F* (1, 135) = 4.01, *p* = .047, η_p^2 = .029, though this effect was rather small. *J.* was perceived as a moral authority especially when (s)he communicated collective moral obligation as motivation for going to the protest ($M_{adjusted}$ = 4.46, *SE* = 0.21) in comparison to collective instrumental motivation ($M_{adjusted}$ = 3.83, *SE* = 0.22), *F* (1, 135) = 4.01, *p* = .047, η_p^2 = .029. There were no significant differences between individual moral (*M* = 3.90, *SE* = 0.22) and individual instrumental motivations (*M* = 4.16, *SE* = 0.21), *F* <1.

Explorative items.

In line with the effects on how representative *J.* is of the larger ingroup (i.e. students), there was a strong main effect of communicating individual or collective motivations *F* (1, 137) = 9.66, *p* = .002, η_p^2 = .066, qualified by a marginally significant interaction effect, *F* (1, 137) = 2.87, *p* = .092, η_p^2 = .021, on the extent to which *J.*'s opinion reflected an individual or a group stance (see Table 4.4). The students who did not go to the demonstration felt that *J.* was representing more the ingroup's opinion when (s)he communicated collective motivations ($M_{adjusted}$ = 3.90, *SE* = 0.22), instead of individual ones ($M_{adjusted}$ = 2.95, *SE* = 0.21). Moreover, communicating collective moral obligation as a motivation for action was seen as more representative of the larger group's (i.e. all students) opinion *(*$M_{adjusted}$ = 4.38, *SE* = 0.31), in contrast to communicating collective instrumental motivation ($M_{adjusted}$ = 3.42, *SE* = 0.31), *F* (1, 137) = 4.90, *p* = .028, η_p^2 = .035. There was no difference between the two individual conditions which were both seen as representing just an individual opinion (M_{moral} = 2.91, *SE* = 0.31 vs. $M_{instrumental}$ = 2.98, *SE* = 0.29, *F* < 1).

There were no effects on other items. Overall, *J.* was seen as a likable person (*M* = 4.89, *SD* = 1.04), relatively similar to the non-protesters (*M* = 3.92, *SD* = 1.44) and the reasons for going to the protest were seen as legitimate (*M* = 5.61, *SD* = 1.09) . Similarly to the protesters, the passive students also thought *J.* was more likely to be a man (65.2% vs. 34.8%) χ^2 (1) = 13.11, *p* < .001, and of left political orientation (*M* = 2.84, SD = 1.24; there were no effects of the manipulation).

Table 4.4

Study 2: Perceptions of a Protester J. as an Authority and Explorative Items

	Manipulations							
	Moral				Instrumental			
	Individual		Collective		Individual		Collective	
Dependent variables	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*
Influence	2.66 [ab]	1.26	2.97[a]	0.87	2.53 [ab]	1.01	2.34 [b]	0.87
Moral authority	3.94 ab	1.41	4.41 [a]	1.21	4.16 [ab]	1.13	3.83 [b]	1.34
Reason legitimacy	5.64	1.33	5.79	0.84	5.34	0.97	5.69	1.16
Group opinion	2.83[a]	1.89	4.40[b]	1.96	2.97 [a]	1.55	3.49[ab]	1.84
Liking	4.69	1.21	4.89	1.08	4.82	0.95	5.18	0.87
Personal similarity	3.83	1.63	4.34	1.33	3.53	1.45	4.00	1.26
J. Political orientation	2.63	1.38	2.94	1.30	3.03	1.26	2.71	1.02

Note. Superscripts refer to significant mean differences.

DISCUSSION

The findings of Study 2 indicated, as expected, that the non-protesters had quite a positive impression of their fellow group member who went to the demonstration. In line with our expectations, when *J.* communicated collective motivations (and especially a collective moral obligation), (s)he was seen as more representative of the larger group's views. Moreover, this increased the extent to which the protester was seen as a representative of the larger ingroup. In contrast to our expectations, different motivations for action had little effects on character evaluation. Across the board, the protester was supported by the ingroup and seen as a prototypical group member. Thus, we did not find the evidence that the protesters were seen as complainers (Becker & Barreto, 2014; Garcia et al., 2010), but, by contrast, they were rather appreciated by their fellow passive group members.

However, expressing a moral motivation for action evoked ambivalent reactions. On the one hand, the protester who voiced moral motivation for action was perceived as being more realistic, but also perceived as wanting to impose her/his opinions which was not seen so positively (as this was correlated with dislike). These results suggest that the protesters can come across as preachers (see Monin et al., 2008). However, unlike the protesters in Study 1, the non-protesters did not make a clear boundary between themselves and those who went to the demonstrations, but as expected perceived those who did act as representative group members.

Although the overall effects of the manipulation were relatively small, they appeared to be relatively consistent and robust taking into account that the both studies were conducted outside of the laboratory settings. To check whether with the given sample sizes (*N1* = 187 and *N2*= 144) enabled us to detect the population effects of similar magnitude (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007), we conducted a power sensitivity analysis using G*Power 3.1.7. With power set to 1-β = .80 and α set to .05 for the two-way factorial ANOVA, we obtained similar parameters for both studies (Study 1: λ = 7.93, critical *F* value of 3.89 and an effect size *f* = .21; Study 2: λ = 7.96, critical *F* value of 3.91 and an effect size *f* = .23). Thus, both studies were sensitive enough to detect small to moderate effects, as an *f* of .21 is equal to an eta square of .04. The significant effects in this study ranged from .03 to .07, which further increases our confidence in this respect.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

The current set of studies aimed to answer the question whether active and passive student subgroups perceived and evaluated each other symmetrically, in response to manipulated motivations voiced by a fellow student for his/her (in)action. Our answer to this question can be summarized in three statements. First, our findings support scholarly and lay assumptions that the students who went to protest were driven by *moral and collective* concerns, while those who stayed home were driven by *instrumental and individual* concerns. Second, mutual perceptions and the evaluations of protesters and non-protesters were largely *asymmetrical*: the active members disapproved and distanced from the passive ones, whereas those who did not act positively evaluated those who did. Third, the denial of moral motivations for action was met with more anger among protesters and with a harsher evaluation of the non-protesters. On the other hand, the protester who emphasized collective concerns was perceived as a more representative member of the larger group. Thus, as we hypothesized, when expectations about what motivates inaction (e.g. instrumentality) or action (e.g. collective concerns) were violated, the subjective distance between the two subgroups increased even more. Together, this suggests a clear asymmetry between the subgroups in terms of their perceptions and evaluations of each other, which may represent a significant obstacle to group unity and social change.

Theoretical and Practical Implications

The current research contributes to the literature by showing that the pathway to social change may not only depend on intergroup relations (i.e. the disadvantaged and the advantaged; Dixon, Levine, Reicher & Durrheim, 2012; van Zomeren et al., 2008), but also on the intragroup relations, i.e. between those who act against collective disadvantage and those who do not. Present findings regarding the asymmetrical perceptions between active and passive members fit more broadly with the research focusing on intragroup relations and their impact on intergroup relations (Dovidio, 2013; Greijdanus, Postmes, Gordijn, & van Zomeren, 2015). From this perspective, our studies represent an important step in answering why movements sometimes fail to build a unified and strong group to fight its disadvantage, as the misperceptions between the different members of the group may decrease group cohesiveness and lead to dysfunctional intragroup relations.

An important conclusion of Study 1 is that for the protesters, participation in collective action becomes the defining characteristics of group membership. Therefore, those who violate the action norms are not only evaluated negatively, but are more importantly not categorized as members of the same group. In other words, the non-protester is seen as an ingroup deviant or "black sheep" (Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988). Although ostracizing the bad apples who broke the solidarity norms (Akkerman et al., 2013, Thommes et al., 2014) can be sometimes beneficial especially for smaller groups (Kerr et al., 2009), it is less so in the present context. Rather, those who act should focus on securing strong ties with their ingroup as their support is necessary in renegotiating power relations with the outgroup.

The findings of Study 2 suggest that the larger ingroup is actually very sympathetic of those who participate in collective action, which to some extent stands in contrast to the previous work on those who challenge discrimination (e.g. Becker & Barreto, 2014). However, the contexts described in those studies referred mostly to the context of individual discrimination, while we focused on the situation of collective disadvantage in which the non-protesters were not outsiders, but were objectively affected by the situation and could directly profit from the protesters' actions. Moreover, the results suggest that the protesters could easily harvest this support especially by communicating collective concerns. Since being perceived as a representative group member is one of the key features of successful leadership (van Knippenberg, 2011), the protesters have a potential to become role models who could eventually motivate the passive ones to act. Still, this potential may never be realized if those who act draw clear boundaries between themselves and the rest of the group.

Finally, our work extends the view of values as motivators of social change (van Zomeren, 2013) to examining the impact of their communication on the politicization and mobilization process. Importantly, we found that moral communication can easily increase the gap between the members of the same group which is in line with our previous work on the effects of value communication among ideologically diverse group members (Kutlaca, van Zomeren & Epstude, 2016). Although attitudes that are moralized are better predictor of behaviour compared to those that are not (Skitka et al., 2005), moral communication is a double-edged strategy, as failing to uphold them can be threatening and demotivate further engagement (Täuber, van Zomeren, & Kutlaca, 2015). These findings are also of relevance for collective action practitioners. Specifically, social movements should be careful when using value-laden messages so as to avoid being seen as too insistent and they should also be open to communicate and not distance from those who may disagree with their ideological views.

Limitations and Directions for Future Research

In both studies we encountered a methodological issue with groups not being completely equal across the conditions on the pre-measures, even though we used random assignment and standardized the procedure[23]. As we controlled for these differences in our analyses, we believe that our findings are, across the board, reliable. The methodological literature usually points out that using field experiments increases the external validity of findings, but comes with costs in terms of possibility to exert control (Cialdini, 2009; Keizer, Lindenberg, & Steg, 2014). However, we would like to emphasize that from a methodological point of view randomization per se does not rule out the possibility that the groups will differ on some dimensions, which applies both to laboratory and field experiments (Thye, 2007; West, Cham & Liu, 2014). Therefore, we would recommend for both field and laboratory experiments to use and report relevant pre-measures and formally check, rather than assume, whether the groups are equivalent as intended.

Furthermore, we acknowledge several theoretical limitation of the present research. First of all, according to lay perceptions actions are more clearly connected to goal progress (Ferguson, 2007), and in general evaluated more positively compared to inactions (McCulloch, Li, Hong, & Albarracin, 2012). However, the character evaluation

23 We made sure the questionnaires looked identical, our research assistants were blind to the conditions and had a randomized order of all possible conditions that they could give to the participants. The research assistants also did not experience problems in motivating the protesters and non-protesters to fill out the questionnaires.

in both studies were rather moderate, hence this could not account for our results. Second, we only looked at a normative action (i.e. protesting), whereas some members may also engage in non-normative and violent actions (e.g. actions like occupying a building, clashing with the police), which are less likely to be supported by the larger ingroup (Becker & Barreto, 2014). Moreover, some inactions can also be interpreted as at least indirectly contributing to the group's cause (e.g. not paying tuition fees as a sign of dissatisfaction with the university), even though these individuals may never actively participate in the protests. Thus, one potential venue for future research is to look at the full spectrum of actions and inactions.

CONCLUSION

The present research fills an important gap in the literature on collective action by looking at the intragroup relations between the members of disadvantaged groups who engage in active struggle against injustice and those who remain passive. We tested and confirmed that these two subgroups are indeed driven by different sets of motives (collective-moral vs. individual-instrumental) and that their mutual perceptions are highly asymmetrical even to point where they may redefine group boundaries. Moreover, we showed that the motives put forward as explanations for their (in)actions play an additional role in bringing or further separating the two subgroups. Our findings have important theoretical and practical implications, as these misperceptions may especially affect the activists and demotivate them from seeking the larger group support which clearly does not raise the disadvantaged group's chances of achieving social change.